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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Context 
It is well known that the exchange rate plays a central role in an open economy. For most 
African countries, the role has been amplified by structural adjustment in which achieving a 
realistic exchange rate has been a key objective. For the CFA franc zone countries, the issue 
is complicated even more because they have institutionally pegged their common currency 
to the French franc. This paper addresses exchange rate options for the CFA franc in the light 
of European monetary integration by the year 1999, when a single European currency is 
likely to emerge. 
What is the problem? 
The CFA franc has been pegged to the French franc for nearly 50 years. The Maastricht 
accord of December 1991, which calls for a single European currency (the "euro") by 1999, 
means that in a few years time the French franc will effectively cease to exist. This gives rise 
to the question, What is the fate of the CFA franc in relation to the single European currency? 
Reassurances that the CFAF would be pegged to the euro raised even more questions, 
because they were made without either consultation with African partners in the Franc Zone 
or consideration of the impact of singling out the CFAF over the currencies of other develop-
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ing countries. Nor did they address questions of the basis on which such a peg would be 
implemented. This study explores some of the options open to CFA countries. 
Exchange rate concepts and alternatives 
Developing countries currently have three options for their exchange rate regimes: 
• Fixed exchange rate 
• Independent floating rate 
• Intermediate regime, i.e., adjustable peg or crawling peg 
Criteria for choosing one or the other are uncertain and differ from country to country. The 
fixed rate is supposed to favour low inflation, but it will vary with the value of the pegged 
currency. Independent flotation gives greater flexibility as it is primarily market determined, 
but it can be unstable. Intermediate regimes have flexibility, but reserve the right to correct 
for disequilibrium. 
The Franc Zone countries not only have fixed exchange rates, but their rates are fixed to 
a single currency, the French franc. This should have both advantages and disadvantages. On 
the plus side, pegging to a single currency should reduce the fluctuations in the exchange 
rate between a developing and a developed country, which should facilitate trade and capital 
flows. Moreover, when a developing country pegs to an external anchor, it broadly aligns its 
policies with those of the pegged country; this may stimulate investment. Finally, a fixed 
regime may be regarded as more disciplined and resulting in greater stability. 
The CFAF countries have not realized the benefits of the single currency peg. The low 
inflation that they have experienced has been offset by declining productivity, low invest-
ment volume and disadvantages when trading with partners other than France. 
Exchange rate options for the CFA franc after 1999 
With the likelihood that the French franc will not exist as a national currency after 1999, it is 
time to consider the future of the CFA franc. The authors see five possible scenarios: 
1. Pegging to the euro - The euro seems to be the natural anchor, given that the CFAF is 
already linked to it through the French franc. Because of the strict requirements of the 
Maastricht accord, the euro can be expected to exhibit low inflation and will be strong enough 
to ensure that no single African currency would influence the direction in which other coun-
tries will want to go. There are then two options for pegging to the euro, separately as the 
BEAC franc and the BCEAO franc, or combined into a single unit. Each option has advan-
tages and disadvantages, including guarantee of convertibility, exchange rate, etc., and these 
must be sorted out. What would be the mechanisms for convertibility, and indeed, why should 
the CFAF have guaranteed convertibility when other developing countries' currencies do 
not? 
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2. Multi-currency pegging - The CFA countries trade with the EEC more than with any 
single country in the world. However, most of their imports are denominated in US dollars, 
as are most grants and loans from the major financial institutions. And more and more trans-
actions are denominated in the Japanese yen. It may therefore be desirable to peg the CFAF 
to a composite basket of the euro, dollar and yen. But all the CFA countries should have the 
same basket to avoid problems of cross rates and the rigidities of a single currency peg. 
3. ECOWAS-wide single currency - One of the biggest impediments to intra-community 
trade in ECOWAS is the diversity of currencies and currency regulations in the countries of 
the bloc. Currency convertibility is a major issue, and the CFAF is convertible by only 7 of 
the 16 ECOWAS countries. A single currency within the region has been mooted as a way to 
solve the convertibility problems. How would the CFAF in its new relationship to the euro 
relate to an ECOWAS currency? 
4. Breakdown of the Franc Zone and creation of separate currencies - The CFA countries 
are not really a homogenous group. There are wide differences, not only between the two 
components of the Franc Zone, but within each one, in levels of income, movements of 
capital, factors of production costs, growth rates and other indicators. Therefore, the possi-
bility of disagreement among the countries on issues like exchange rate alignment is very 
real, and could threaten the integrity of the Franc Zone. Such a result goes against all the 
trends toward economic union and would further balkanize the monetary system in Africa. 
5. Institutionalizing an African monetary fund - Some pan-Africanists think that a conti-
nent-wide monetary union would be the answer to all the troubles of the continent. The 
economic summit in Lagos in 1980 called for economic integration of Africa by 1985. The 
deadline is long past, a testimony to lack of political will. How can such a proposal be taken 
seriously? 
Policy Implications 
From the examination of all the possible exchange rate arrangements, the study indicates 
that an adjustable peg to the euro at an early stage would be the best arrangement, with a 
convertibility guarantee at the European Central Bank. But which CFAF to be pegged—the 
BCEAO/UEMOA CFAF or the BEAC/CEMAC CFAF? Can nations with a single currency 
and a common central bank that is accountable not to the nation states but to a common body 
(UEMOA or CEMAC) be truly independent? (An issue with which some EU members are 
still not fully comfortable.) Can the policy of convergence under UEMOA and CEMAC 
offset national self-interest and specific budget constraints? 
The option of a multi-currency pegging to the euro, US dollar and Japanese yen does not 
appear feasible for the very near future, as a learning process to manage the adjustable peg is 
necessary. Nor does the option of an ECOWAS-wide single currency appeal, though it is 
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desirable: ti me is needed for ECOWAS to become better organized and its institutions opera-
tional. 
The least attractive option is separate currencies for the individual CFA countries, which 
goes against the trends of building trading blocs and would further fragment African econo-
mies. Finally, there is the possibility of an African monetary fund that will clear the way for 
a continent-wide currency. We feel that this option is premature and the effort should be put 
into implementing one of the first three scenarios. 
The next research task is to study the underlying economic adjustment in CFA econo-
mies under a flexible CFAF pegging regime. This will give insights into the performance of 
the CFAF in the new world currency order. 
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I. Introduction 
It is well-known that the exchange rate plays a central role in an open economy. Indeed, 
economists have written a lot about exchange rates, especially during the last 20 years. 
According to Aghevli, Khan and Montiel (1991): 
The exchange rate performs a dual role in small open economies. Its 
movements can achieve and maintain international competitiveness and so 
ensure a viable balance of payments. At the same time, a stable exchange 
rate can anchor domestic prices. A debate has emerged, however, in both 
policymaking and academic circles on the relative weight that should be 
assigned to each of these objectives in formulating exhange rate policy. 
Fundamentally, and put differently, exchange rate changes have important pervasive 
effects, with consequences on prices, wages, interest rates, production levels and 
employment opportunities, and hence direct or indirect implications for the well-being 
of economic agents. 
The emergence of the role of the exchange rate stemmed from the collapse of the 
post-war international monetary system after 15 August 1971. Under the Bretton Woods 
Accord, member countries of the IMF kept their currencies at a fixed exchange rate or at 
best at fixed rates within narrow ranges with occasional adjustments. The official IMF 
classification made three broad categories: fixed or pegged exchange rate; flexible 
exchange rate; and an in-between exchange rate arrangement known as crawling peg. 
For most African countries, the role of the exchange rate has been amplified by 
structural adjustment programmes in which achieving a realistic exchange rate has been 
a key objective. For the CFA franc zone countries, the issue is complicated even more 
because they have institutionally pegged their common currency to the French franc so 
that an independent exchange rate adjusment was ruled out for over 45 years - until 12 
January 1994 when the very first collective exchange rate devaluation occurred, in the 
amount of 50%. 
It is against this backgound that this paper addresses the issue of the likely exchange 
rate arrangement options for the CFA franc in the wake of European monetary integration 
by the year 1999 when, according to the last stage of the Delors Report, a single currency 
will emerge. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I reviews the exchange rate policies that 
developing countries have been implementing since the Bretton Woods accord. That 
includes a recall of the exchange rate concept followed by the main characteristics of 
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developing country economic structures and the various exchange rate regimes that have 
been attempted over the years; Section II lays out the exchange rate options for the CFA 
franc after 1999. Section III makes some concluding remarks. 
Review of exchange rate policy in developing countries 
As a preliminary to the CFA alternative exchange rate options after 1999, it is appropriate 
to review the exchange rate policies that prevailed over the years in developing countries 
in general. Therefore, we first recall the concepts and objectives of exchange rate policies. 
But since the exchange rate regime depends on the degree of the development of the 
economies, we examine next the characteristics of developing countries such as those of 
the CFA zone. Finally, we present the most recent evolution of exchange rate regimes in 
developing countries, thereby clearing the way to the different options available to the 
CFA countries. 
The concepts of exchange rate and objectives of 
exchange rate policy 
The concepts of exchange rate 
Several authors give different definitions of the exchange rate. In most basic international 
economics textbooks, the exchange rate is defined as the price of one nation's currency 
relative to that of another nation's currency. An exchange rate shows the number of units 
of one currency that are needed to buy a unit of the other currency. Among previous 
works on the exchange rate matter, the most recent one is attributable to Collier and 
Joshi (1989) who defined the exchange rate as "relevant relative price indicating the 
competitiveness of tradeables". The nominal exchange rate (NER) simply indicates the 
number of units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. The NER can have 
some influence on the competitiveness of tradeables if it can affect the real exchange 
rate, the latter being the domestic price of tradeables relative to the foreign price of 
tradeables measured in a common currency. 
Pd 
RER 
RER 
NER 
Pf 
NER*(Pf/Pd) 
real exchange rate 
nominal exchange rate 
foreign price; usually the wholesale price of major trading 
partners is used. In CFA countries, the French wholesale price 
Index (WPI) is usually used as foreign price, 
domestic price proxied by the consumer price index 
As Krumm (1987) put it: "Though it is difficult to know with precision the level of 
competitiveness that is required for growth consistent with the healthy external sector, 
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the RER acts as an important signal to economic agents and to those formulating 
macroeconomic policies". 
In other words, the RER is broadly defined as a relative price that summarizes the 
degree of competitiveness of the external sector of a country. Although a country can 
usually alter its currency rate vis-a-vis other currencies by devaluation, it is still possible 
to adjust the rate through the foreign/domestic price ratio. 
This is particularly valid when speaking about CFA countries where devaluation on a 
country basis is ruled out by institutional agreement. Since countries trade with each 
other in an interdependent world, policy makers are concerned not merely with the bilateral 
real exchange rate, but with the real effective exchange rate (REER). The REER is the 
trade-weight adjusted real exchange rate. 
Thus defined, an increase in the REER implies a real appreciation, according to the well-
known purchasing power parity (PPP) definition. 
It should be noted that the nominal exchange rate does not constitute a satisfactory 
indicator for use in economic policy (Ngirabatware, 1986). In fact, in open economies, 
countries trade with different currencies that fluctuate regularly according to the evolution 
of economic fundamentals. This induces a variability of the real exchange rate as defined 
earlier. Hence to take into account the uncertainties associated with hard fluctuations of 
currencies' such as the French franc, the real effective exchange rate represents the best 
exchange rate tool. Several methods have been used to measure the REER by different 
authors (Arthus and. Rhomberg 1973; Rhomberg, 1975; Bautista, 1989; Edwards, 1989, 
1990). 
We should remember that all these different concepts are compared with the ideal 
exchange rate or the equilibrium exchange rate, which will bring internal and external 
current account and payments balance. 
No matter which concept is used, various characteristics of developing countries have 
an important bearing upon the costs of alternative exchange rate regimes. 
The choice of an exchange rate regime must take into consideration the structural 
characteristics of each given economy, the sources of external and domestic shocks, and 
the goals to be achieved. According to policy makers the objectives of the exchange rate 
regime are twofold. First, a realistic exchange rate allows the economy to achieve and to 
maintain competitiveness and thereby to ensure a viable balance of payments. Second, a 
realistic exchange rate will also lead to some stability of the effective real exchange rate 
REERi = 
REERi = 
RERi* Wi 
NERi* (Pj/Pi) * Wj 
country i 
trading partners 
weighting term 
n 
W 
Objectives of the exchange rate policy 
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that will in turn stabilize domestic prices at low levels in developing countries. According 
to Ngirabatware (1986), an adequate exchange rate regime, by increasing economic 
wealth, must raise the standard of living of the population. 
These goals are at times conflicting and neither the fixed nor the flexible exchange 
rate can reach both low stable prices and increase the standard of living of the population. 
According to Aghevli, Khan and Montiel (1991), one issue that must be addressed concerns 
the criterion of optimality. For these authors, "modern analysis... has focused on the 
relatively narrow criterion of macroeconomic stability defined in terms of minimizing 
the variance of real output, the price level or real consumption in the face of random 
transitory shocks". 
Since the structure of an economy influences its functioning, we turn now to the 
most salient characteristics of the developing countries, such as those of the CFA zone. 
Characteristics of developing countries and their 
exchange rate regimes 
Despite their common label, developing countries constitute a rather heterogeneous group, 
even within a sub-group like CFA countries. Indeed, some CFA countries are oil exporters, 
others are oil importers; yet others are landlocked and Sahelian, while others are coastal 
and covered in rain forest and so suitable for tree crops. All these various characteristics 
affecting the production of tradeables, also affect the exchange rate regimes for the CFA 
countries. 
Accordingly, in this part of the study, we indicate what these characteristics are and 
what impact they may have on the exchange rate adjustment process. 
In general, the main differentiating characteristics of developing countries relevant to 
this research relate to their inability to affect export or import prices in foreign currency 
through their own exchange rate policies/the inelastic nature of their demand for imports 
and, in the short run, the inelastic sij]5ply of exports; the rather rudimentary nature of 
their financial sector; and the fact that capital flows are not determined by conventional 
yield considerations, in which case we have capital movements, but rather by political 
considerations, implying capital flight. 
Overall, the main characteristics of developing countries can be grouped into five 
points, which set them apart from developed countries, following Collier and Joshi (1989) 
and Crockett and Nsouli (1977): 
• They tend to have large non-tradeable sectors. Indeed, the manufacturing sector, 
which constitutes the most tradeable part of production, is not highly developed. 
Many developing countries have more than a trivial volume of manufactured goods, 
with the share of industrial products in GDP only about 12% on average. This 
contrasts sharply with more developed economies where a large diversity of 
industrial goods is produced and traded and represents at least 23% of GDP. 
• Developing countries have the majority of their labour force in the primary sector. 
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And since primary products are fairly homogeneous and the volume of exports 
share is small and has no effect on the international market, most of these countries 
are "price takers". Even Cote d'lvoire, which is the world's largest cocoa producer, 
has no control over cocoa prices. 
• Reflecting the highly specialized production structure of developing countries, 
their foreign sector differs in nature and importance from that of more developed 
economies. Because of this, they are more prone to external shocks and need all 
the "tools in the box" to resist these shocks. However, they have tended to respond 
to the balance of payments problem by altering trade restrictions. Distorting policy 
can create allocative inefficiency and lead to substantial changes in income. 
• Economic growth in developing countries, as contrasted with that in industrial 
countries, depends heavily on the foreign sector for two major reasons. First, due 
to inadequate domestic savings availability, private foreign capital inflows play a 
greater role to supplement domestic savings, but not at a sufficient level to attain 
the desired targets. Secondly, dependence on imported manufactured equipment 
from developed countries creates foreign reserves constraint problems. 
• The financial markets in most developing countries are rudimentary, although 
improving gradually over time. The process of financial intermediation is still at a 
developing stage. This limited extent of domestic financial assets calls for more 
direct links between the budget deficit and the money supply, and between money 
supply and the price level. Accordingly, a monetary approach to the balance of 
payments may be more applicable to developing countries than to developed 
countries. 
Given these characteristics, the question arises as to what exchange rate regime may 
be suitable for developing countries. 
Exchange rate arrangements 
According to the IMF's classification, as reported by Collier and Joshi (1989.) and Aghevli, 
Khan and Montiel (1991), developing countries currently have three options for their 
exchange rate regimes: 
• Fixed exchange rate 
• Independent floating rate 
• Intermediate regime, i.e,. an adjustable peg or a crawling peg 
According to these authors, the criteria of the choice of a given exchange rate regime 
are rather uncertain and vary from country to country. Developing countries must not 
neglect any of the criteria that have major influence on the effective real exchange rate. 
The identification of these criteria is particularly difficult. These difficulties stemmed 
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from the reasons for external and domestic shocks as well as temporary and permanent 
shocks. Another source of difficulty is the structural characteristics of developing 
economies. Given these difficulties, developing countries attempt to implement exchange 
rate regimes that can correct for the balance of payments imbalances, that is exchange 
rate regimes that are less "harmful" (Ngirabatware 1986) 
Table 1 below presents this classification of exchange rate regimes in 1987 as it figures 
in the IMF Annual Report, and as reported by Collier and Joshi. Furthermore, Table 2 
summarizes the quantitative importance of the various exchange rate regimes in 
developing countries. 
6 
Table 1: Exchange rate arrangements as of 30 June 1987 
Flexibility limited 
vis-a-vis a single 
Pegged currency or group of currencies More flexible 
Single currency Currency composite 
US dollar French franc Other SDR Other 
Afghanistan4 Suriname Benin Bhutan Burma Algeria 
Antigua and Syrian Burkina Faso (Indian rupee) Burundi Austria 
Barbuda Arab Republic4 Cameroon Kiribati Iran, Islamic Bangladesh4 
Bahamas4 Trinidad and Central African (Australian Republic of Botswana 
Barbados Tobago Republic dollar) Jordan Cape Verde 
Belize Uganda Chad Lesotho4 Kenya Cyprus 
Djibouti Venezuela4 Comoros (S. African Libya7 R ] i „ 
Dominica Vietnam4 Congo rand) Rwanda Finland4 
El Salvador Yemen, Arab C6te d'lvoire Tonga Sao Tome Hungary 
Ethiopia Republic Equatorial (Australian and Principe Israel 
Grenada Yemen, Guinea dollar) Seychelles Kuwait 
Guatemala4 People's Gabon Vanuatu Malawi 
Guyana4 Democratic Mali Malaysia6 
Haiti Republic of Niger Malta 
Honduras Zambia Senegal Mauritius 
Iraq Togo Nepal 
Lao, People's Norway 
Democratic Papua 
Republic Guinea 
Liberia Poland 
Mozambique Romania 
Nicaragua4 
Oman Singapore 
Solomon 
Panama Islands 
Paraguay4 Sudan4 
St Kitts and Sweden13 
Nevis Tanzania 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent Thailand 
Zimbabwe 
Single 
currency^ 
Cooperative 
arrangement3 
Adjusted 
according to 
a set of 
indicators 
Managed independently 
floating floating 
Argentina Australia 
China Bolivia 
Costa Rica4 Canada 
Dominican The Gambia 
Republic Ghana 
Ecuador Guinea 
Egypt4 Japan 
Greece Lebanon 
Guinea- Maldives 
Bissau New Zealand 
Iceland Nigeria4 
India® Philippines 
Indonesia Sierra Leone 
Jamaica Somalia4 
Korea South Africa4 
Mauritania 
Mexico4 '9 United Kingdom 
Morocco United States 
Pakistan Urugauay 
Peru10 Zaire 
Spain 
Sril Lanka 
Tunisia 
Turkey11 
Western 
Samoa 
Yugoslavia 
Bahrain3 
Qatar5 
Saudi Arabia5 
United Arab 
Emirates5 
Belgium4 
Denmark 
France 
Germany, 
Federal 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg4 
Netherlands 
Brazil 
Chile4 
Colombia 
Madagascar 
Portugal 
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Notes to Table 1: 
1 No currency information is available relating to Democratic Kampuchea. 
2 In all cases listed in this column, the US dollar was the currency against which exchange rates showed 
limited flexibility. 
3 This category consists of countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Mon-
etary System. In each case, the exchange rate is maintained within a margin of 2.25% around the bilateral 
central rates against other participating currencies, with the exception of Italy, whose exchange rate is 
maintained within a margin of 6%. 
4 Member maintains dual exchange markets involving multiple exchange arrangements. The arrangement 
shown is that maintained in the major market. 
5 Exchange rates are determined on the basis of a fixed relationship to the SDR, within margins of up to ± 
7.25%. 
6 The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ± 2.25%. 
7 The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ± 7.5%. 
8 The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ± 5% on either side of a weighted composite of the 
currencies of the main trading partners. 
9 After 30 June 1987, the spread between the two exchange rates was less than 1 %. 
"10 Member maintains a system of advance announcement of exchange rates. 
11 The central bank establishes its selling rate daily and the buying rate is set at 0.5% below the selling rate. 
Commercial banks must use the central bank's selling rate, but are free to set their own buying rate. 
12 The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ± 1.5%. 
Table 2: Developing countries: exchange rate regimes in selected years (Number of 
countries) 
1973 1976 1982 1987 
Pegged to a single currency 86 67 56 53 
of which: 
US dollar 54 46 38 34 
French franc 17 13 13 14 
Pound sterling 11 3 1 -
Other 4 5 4 5 
Pegged to a composite . 25 34 37 
of which: 
SDR - 11 15 10 
Other - 14 19 27 
Flexible arrangements 11 15 35 42 
of which: 
Limited flexibility against single currency - 2 10 4 
Adjusted according to a set of indicators 8 6 4 4 
Managed floating - 4 16 22 
Independent floating 3 3 5 12 
Total 97 107 125 132 
Source: Annual Reports of the IMF. 
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Table 3 : Developing countries exchange rate arrangements, 1976-1989. (in percent of total 
number of countries) 
Classification 1976 1979 1983 1989 
Pegged to a single currency 62.6 52.1 43.5 38.2 
U.S. Dollar 43.0 35.0 29.0 23.7 
Other currency 4.7 2.5 3.2 3.9 
(pound sterling) (2.8) (2.6) (0.8) (") 
Pegged to composite 23.4 23.1 28.2 28.2 
SDR 10.3 11.1 11.3 5.3 
Other (currency basket) 13.1 12.0 16.9 22.9 
Flexible arrangements 14.0 24.0 28.3 33.6 
Adjusting to indicators 5.6 3.4 4.0 3.8 
Other1 8.4 21.4 24.3 29.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: IMF Annual Report (1982) IMF Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions and IMF International Financial Stastistics April 1990. 
Notes: Based on mid-year classifications, except for 1989, which is based on end-year classifica-
tion. Excludes democratic Kampuchea, for which no information is available. "I Includes the follow-
ing categories: "flexibility limited vis-a-vis single currency, "managed floating" and "independently 
floating" 
These tables indicate in different ways how many countries have used a particular 
exchange rate regime since major countries started floating their currencies in 1973, 
following the USA's decision of 15 August 1971 to stop the convertibility of the US 
dollar into gold. 
Historically, most major currencies were pegged to the US dollar, which became a de 
facto international reserve after World War II. Such a peg was an adjustable one before 
August 1971. 
In developing countries, apart from being pegged to the US dollar, currencies of most 
ex-colonies of France and Britain were pegged to the French franc and the pound sterling 
respectively, themselves pegged to the US dollar. The particular case of the ex-French 
colonies, which is our main concern here, drew considerable attention because their 
fixed peg has not changed since 1948. Such fixity may come to an end sometime after 
1999 and our goal is to seek alternative pegging or just alternative exchange rate regimes, 
to which we will come back later in detail. 
As Table 2 shows, since the general flotation in 1973, some changes occurred as 
many countries reacted to the costs of single-currency pegging. Mainly, there has been a 
switch from single currency pegging to multi-currency pegging. Moreover, some 
developing countries even made the move to float their currency vis-a-vis the major 
ones. Table 3 shows the evolution of the different exchange rate regimes in percent of the 
number of countries. It indicates that the proportion of developing countries that have 
pegged their currency to a single currency has declined drastically, from 63% in 1976 to 
38% in 1989. The proportion of countries that have pegged their currency to the US 
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dollar went from 43% to 24%. The proportion of currencies pegged to the British pound 
fell considerably, from 2.8% in 1976 to 0.8% in 1983. In 1989 no currency was pegged 
to the British pound. The proportion of currencies pegged to the IMF SDR also declined 
from 10.3% to 5.3%. The pegging to the French franc constitutes an exceptional case. 
Indeed the majority of francophone countries have maintained their fixed parity with the 
French franc. 
However, one could note from Tables 2 and 3 that the exhange rate regime evolution 
is in favour of pegging to a basket of currencies. In fact, in 1976, the number of countries 
that pegged their currency to a basket was 14. In 1987 that number had increased to 27. 
Proportionally, the number of countries that pegged their currencies to a basket increased 
from 13.1% in 1976 to 22.9% in 1989. According to Aghevli, Khan and Montiel (1991): 
The decision by an increasing number of developing countries to switch 
their pegging arrangement from a single currency to a composite basket 
of currencies has been prompted partly by the desire to minimize the 
adverse effects on their economies of fluctuations in the exchange rates 
of major currencies that have taken place since the advent of generalized 
floating in 1973, and particularly in 1980s. 
However, the most important evolution is in favour of flotation. The proportion of 
countries that adopted a flexible exchange rate regime increased from 14.6% in 1976 to 
33.6% in 1989. Aghevli et al. (1991, p.3) attributed the change to 
the high level of domestic rates of inflation in many developing countries 
during the 1980s; the uncertainty associated with the fluctuations in the 
exchange rates of the major currencies.... Such an arrangement enables the 
authorities to take advantage of the fluctuations in major currencies to 
camouflage an effective depreciation of their exchange rate, thus avoiding 
the political repercussions of an announced devaluation. 
Any choice between fixed pegging, independent flotation and an intermediate 
adjustable peg carries with it some advantages and some inconveniences. In examining 
these points, it is worth noting that the choice between exchange rate regimes concerns 
essentially the fixity or variability of the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, any exchange 
rate regime, fixed or variable, is capable in principle of correcting for balance of payments 
. disequilibrium by altering the real exchange rate in the same way that a floating regime 
will. 
Fixed exchange rate 
Conceptually, the fixed exchange rate is supposed to favour low inflation. Unfortunately, 
if wages and prices are downwardly rigid, the process of achieving external and internal 
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balance in the event of unfavourable external shocks, such as the oil price or the fall in 
commodi ty prices, can be non-converging. In such a case, these shocks can cause large 
losses in output and employment. 
How did the fixed CFA exchange rate operate in the recent economic crisis years? 
The strict monetary discipline has verified the case for low inflation stemming from a 
fixed CFA exchange rate. Indeed, the average inflation rate for CFA countries has been 
about 10% in recent years, whereas other African countries reach up to 20% inflation 
rate (Oladeji, 1988). 
The pressing question remains as to whether low inflation constitutes an economic 
goal per se. In fact, at what price did CFA countries achieve low inflation? Recent studies 
(Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991) on the fixity of the CFA rate showed that low inflation 
was achieved at a high cost of output and employment. More on this issue will follow. 
For the time being, it is useful to know that there are two forms of the exchange rate 
that have a fixed parity: the single currency peg and the multi-currency peg. 
Let us examine each peg in turn. 
The single currency peg 
According to Crockett and Nsouli (1977), pegging to a single major currency seemed to 
have been the option most favoured by developing countries. From a practical viewpoint, 
it is the simplest. It involves no more than continuing the exchange rate policy that 
prevailed before the end of the system established since Bretton Woods. Table 1 above 
indicates that although many countries have switched away from single-currency pegging, 
this arrangement is still practiced in some 20 countries, as Collier and Joshi reported 
(1989, p. 101). Among these 20 countries are the 13 ex-French colonies grouped in the 
CFA zone, and some small Central American countries such as Panama that pegged their 
currency to the US dollar. 
Various advantages as well as disadvantages may be attributed in theory to pegging 
the value of a developing country's currency to that of its major trading partner. 
Advantages of single-currency peg: There are four known advantages attached to a 
single-currency peg. First, pegging to a particular currency, like the French franc for 
CFA countries, may reduce, relative to other alternatives, the fluctuations of the exchange 
rate between the developing and the developed country. Other things being equal, this 
facilitates trade between the two countries by reducing the uncertainties associated with 
changes in the exchange rate. Similarly, capital flows for investment purposes may 
increase. 
Concerning the CFA case, one can consider two periods: 1962-1980, and thereafter 
till now. From 1962 to 1980, and especially during the coffee and cocoa boom in the 
1970s, trade between France and CFA countries stood at about 50%-60% per cent of 
total trade. Capital flows were high. The balance of the operations account was positive. 
But after world commodity prices started falling sharply in the 1980s, export earnings 
were reduced and subsequently the balance of the operations account became negative 
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for countries such as C6te d'lvoire and Senegal; trade and capital flow dropped 
dramatically. This casts doubt on the ability of the single-currency pegging mechanism 
to adjust to unforeseen external shocks. Despite single-currency pegging coupled with 
low inflation, investment volume dropped and many French firms closed shop, profitability 
being reduced by the weak demand caused by low real income. 
The second advantage of single-currency pegging relates to the relative stability of 
the industrial nations vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Here again, after 1971, several swings 
in the major currency (US dollar) occurred to which the FF reacted. In addition, recession 
in industrial countries offset monetary stability, so much so that trade was not stimulated, 
but rather hampered by protective barriers, related tariffs or non-tariff barriers, despite 
the ongoing Uruguay round. The protective economic environment overwhelmed any 
stability provided by single-currency pegging. Countries like Cote d'lvoire could not 
increase trade despite monetary stability, since market access became extremely difficult. 
Third, a developing country that pegs its currency to an external anchor, such as the 
French franc, intends to align its policies broadly to those of the partner country: this 
might increase confidence in the CFA franc. 
This may, in turn, stimulate investment. But because of the difference in the level of 
productivity, and the policies adopted by industrial countries such as France to remain 
competitive vis-a-vis other EEC countries, single rate fixity may not be regarded as 
adequate to promote long term stability. We have shown that CFA countries have more 
and more diversified trading partners. In such a case, "if the peg-currency floats against 
major currencies, the developing country's normal and real effective exchange rate also 
floats but without any reference to its own needs" (Collier and Joshi, 1989,pp. 101-102). 
This has been the case for the CFA countries. Their imports still come largely from 
France, although they are more diversified than before. But the CFA countries' export 
destinations are geographically diversified. Thus converting major currencies, say the 
dollar or yen, into FF at the operations account leads to exchange rate costs, as we have 
computed. 
Changes in the dollar-franc exchange rate have had substantial undesirable effects 011 
CFA economies. 
Finally, the disciplinary aspects of pegging can sometimes be viewed as an advantage 
if a fixed rate acts as "a fulcrum for domestic stability" according to the 1970 Report of 
the Fund's Executive Directors. This report argues as follows: 
... the need to defend a fixed exchange rate against depreciations may 
promote political willingness to impose unpopular domestic restraints; 
and where the attempt to defend the parity is ultimately unsuccessful, 
the psychological shock of a devaluation may promote broad support 
for the necessary associated measures to curtail domestic demand. For 
CFA countries, on the criteria of external and internal balance, a major 
benefit that analysts mentioned arises from the anti-inflationary discipline 
provided by the peg. Indeed, the CFA zone is best regarded not as an 
exchange rate policy but as a budgetary policy. Members are not able to 
finance budget deficits by printing money beyond limits set by a non-
national monetary authority. 
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The question that arises is: can an independent monetary authority, set by itself and 
for i tse l f , pursue some domestic monetary growth rate in accordance with its 
macroeconomic policy? Whatever the case, low inflation has brought other heavy 
disturbances in CFA countries. Let Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) tell the story: 
For most of the CFA members, the benefits of lower inflation do not appear 
to have been large enough to offset the costs of reduced output (high 
unemployment). Under "reasonable" output-inflation trade-off, these 
countries would have been better off having the flexibility to adjust to 
external shocks through exchange rate adjustment. 
Disadvantages of a single-currency peg: In addition to the difficulty of realizing the 
benefits of a single-currency peg in CFA countries, there are four genuine disadvantages 
for such peg. Indeed, a single currency peg in a world of major floating currencies does 
not have the same consequences as adopting a fixed exchange rate in a world of stable 
parities. Hence, there exist potential drawbacks to a system in which all countries adhere 
to par values. 
The first drawback is the need for increased foreign reserves. Indeed exchange rate 
fluctuations in the pegged currency will not reflect actual developments in the balance of 
payments of the pegged-currency country; rather they will reflect the development in the 
balance of payments of the industrial country to which the developing country is pegged. 
The amount of reserves needed will depend on the nature of the relationship between 
the equilibrium exchange rate of the two countries. If the relationship is close and positive, 
induced changes in the developing countries exchange rate vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
will usually be in the right direction. However, if, as is perhaps more likely, the factors 
affecting the equilibrium exchange rate of the two countries are not closely related, the 
need for reserves may be greater than under an adjustable regime. 
For the Franc zone, to our knowledge, there has been no study dealing systematically 
with equilibrium exchange between CFA and FF. However, it is well known that the 
CFA is over-valued by at least 30%-50% depending on the methodology used for the 
computation. No matter the degree of over-valuation, this has economic consequences 
with regard to microeconomic allocative efficiency. Exchange rate disequilibrium leads 
to wasteful movements of resources, by increased imports and less incentive for export 
activities. That is the reason a devaluation has been so often called for in recent years for 
CFA countries. 
A second drawback is that a single-currency peg may interfere with the pursuit of 
internal policy objectives, especially in the presence of exogenous and independent 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. One may consider for example the case of developing 
countries, such as CFA countries, trying to stimulate national production and employment 
to move out of their continuing economic crisis. An exogenous fluctuation that increases 
the value of the intervention currency, the French franc for our purposes, will lower the 
local price of imports and exports, thus stimulating imports and curbing the incentives to 
export. The overall effect may be a reduction in local production and employment, as the 
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Cote d'lvoire has been experiencing. Resulting from the uncertainties associated with 
the production and consumption of tradeables, there may be a diversion of activity towards 
non-traded sectors. 
A third disadvantage with single-currency pegging in a world floating system, is that 
exchange rates between developing countries' currencies will be volatile since different 
countries peg to different major currencies, such as the US dollar or the French franc. 
This is particularly pernicious when, in a sub-region like West Africa, many countries of 
small size are trying to attain some market advantages by promoting intra-regional trade. 
Pegging to a single-currency in the context of generalized flotation is, therefore, not 
a continuation of the exchange rate policy under adjustable par values since the world 
conditions changed in August 1971. The single peg does reveal some clear-cut identifiable 
disadvantages, which we have indicated. In an attempt to limit these problems, some 
developing countries decided to peg their currency to a weighted basket of currencies 
that takes into consideration the trade share relationship. 
The multi-currency peg 
According to Collier and Joshi (1989, p. 102) "the object of the multi-currency peg is to 
eliminate the effect of third currency fluctuations by pegging the nominal effective 
exchange rate, or in other words, by pegging the home currency to a suitable average of 
foreign exchange rate". Multi-currency pegging is an attempt to mimic a fixed exchange 
rate in a world of floating currencies. This alternative peg tries to retain the advantages 
of pegging while minimizing the disadvantages. But to advocate a stable effective 
exchange rate implies the choice of weights. The appropriate weights depend on the 
policy variables policy makers wish to stabilize. For small countries such as those in the 
CFA zone, this clearly points to the internal and external balance; accordingly, this comes 
to stabilizing the price of tradeables relative to non-tradeables. This requires the use of 
bilateral shares of partner countries as the appropriate weights. For large countries, this 
requires the use of elasticity-base weights. 
In any case, the most comprehensive measure of a country's effective exchange rate 
would include its trade and payment structure, the price effects generated by exchange 
rate changes, the price elasticities for different products, the competitive relationships of 
a country's exports, the pattern of bilateral trade, and the effects on capital flows. Such a 
comprehensive and sophisticated index has yet to be constructed. The best approximation 
so far has been the IMF's multilateral exchange rate model (Rhomberg, 1975). The volume 
of data required to construct such an index prohibits small developing countries without 
a decent data base from attempting to do so. 
Three indexes based on the pattern of merchandise trade are usually constructed: 
• the export-weighted index 
• the import-weighted index 
• the bilateral trade index 
ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES FOR THE C F A FRANC AFTER 1 9 9 9 1 5 
The export-weighted index of a country's currency is the arithmetic average of its 
exchange rate against other currencies relative to a base period, weighted by the share of 
each trading partner in the export of the country concerned. Similarly, the import-weighted 
index is the arithmetic average of its exchange rate against other currencies, relative to a 
base period, weighted by the share of each country in the imports of the country concerned. 
The bilateral trade index is the arithmetic average of the export-weighted index and 
the import-weighted index, weighted by the shares of exports and imports, respectively, 
in the sum total of imports and exports. 
All three indexes permit in some way the pattern of bilateral trade. However, they do 
not take into account repercussions on prices, substitution effects, changes in 
competitiveness and effects on capital accounts. 
For developing countries, because of the relative homogeneity of primary commodities, 
the import-weighted index provides the closest approximation to the effective exchange 
rate index. Indeed, prices of primary commodities are set in world markets independently 
of the precise geographical pattern of trade. Hence, for a given volume of exports, foreign 
exchange earnings will not be affected by changes in the prices of the exchange rate of 
the countries to which they export. Industrial countries, on the contrary, export products 
are not homogeneous; consequently, no uniform international price prevails and changes 
in the exchange rates will affect the price paid by the importing countries. The import 
price index denominated in local currency will be affected by changes in the sources of 
supply of its imports or by changes in exchange rates among supplying countries. Thus, 
the purchasing power of the foreign exchange earned will vary according to the 
geographical distribution of imports. 
The import-weighted basket peg has the advantage of reducing the price instability 
generated by foreign exchange rate changes. Multi-currency pegging retains some 
disadvantages. Specifically, there is the problem that, due to each developing country 
using different basket, there would be varying cross rates between all developing countries 
using such baskets. Under the single-currency peg, there is at least stability amongst 
currencies using the same peg. This implies that CFAF countries would be better off 
pegging to a common basket, should the opportunity arise. Furthermore, the use of an 
unfamiliar peg for each country's currency, such as the CFAF, may render the countries 
less attractive as outlets for foreign investments. 
In order to overcome these intangible drawbacks associated with the construction of 
separate baskets for each country, some countries have pegged to a common numeraire 
with an already existing international status, the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). As of 
1987, ten countries had pegged their currency to the SDR. The case for such pegging to 
a numeraire is that it will reduce cross-rates variability and may stimulate intra-regional 
trade. Moreover, pegging to the SDR has the convenience of published daily data on the 
basis of the exchange rates in major financial markets and is based on the trade share of 
16 major industrial countries. 
The case against pegging to the SDR stems from the fact that it does not reflect 
movements in the effective exchange rate quite as closely as an import-weighted basket. 
Some interesting salient features emerge from Table 4. First, for most countries the SDR 
peg deviates very little from the import-weighted basket peg. In most cases, the standard 
deviation does not exceed 3%. In some other rare cases, the SDR index coincides almost 
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exactly with the import-weighted index, such as in Ghana. 
Second, the SDR basket peg shows a smaller standard percentage deviation than a 
single currency peg. For countries pegging to the US dollar, the differences are quite 
dramatic. For countries pegged to the UK pound, the results are mixed. In some cases, 
the standard percentage deviation is less than that of an SDR peg. 
With regard to the French franc peg, the table shows that it is significantly better than 
the SDR peg. For instance, the standard percentage deviation of the SDR peg as compared 
with the French franc is two times more for Cameroon, four times more for the Central 
African Republic, five times more for Chad, and four times more for Congo and Gabon. 
From the pattern of trade of these nations, we can conclude that, in general, "the more 
diversified the import structure of a country, the closer will be the movement of the SDR 
basket index to the import-weighted index" (Crockett and Nsouli, 1977). 
Given the fact that the percentage deviation point for the French franc is better than 
any other peg, pegging with a reference to some disciplinary restrictions for stability 
would be better for the CFAF. Hence, we would opt for pegging to the future European 
single currency, the European currency unit (ECU) now called euro, which will require 
strict discipline, rather than the SDR. 
Independent flotation 
To overcome the disadvantages of fixed exchange rates, either single currency peg or 
multi-currency peg, one may advise developing countries to consider greater flexibility 
in their exchange rates. This may necessitate abandoning pegs in order to achieve 
continuous adjustment to external shocks. Indeed, a floating exchange rate regime is one 
in which the exchange rate is predominantly market-determined. Here, too, a trade-off 
operates between the benefits of pegging against the advantages of a more continuous 
adjustment of the external position. It should be noted that flexible rates for developing 
countries have different implications compared with industrial countries, mainly because 
of their different institutional setting. 
We will centre our discussion around the costs and benefits involved in flotation with 
particular emphasis on the issues of exchange rate stability, the use of the exchange rate 
as a policy instrument and the freedom of internal policy making. 
As mentioned earlier, relatively stable exchange rates have several advantages: the 
greater the stability of the exchange rate, the greater the level of trade, the greater the 
production of export goods, the greater the capital inflows from developed countries and 
the greater the level of capital formation, other things being equal. Accordingly, if flotation 
were to lead to unstable exchange rates, this arrangement would be undesirable. For 
flexible exchange rates to be stable without government intervention, a well functioning 
foreign exchange market with Walrasian auctioneers is needed. 
In any case, the classical case for a floating exchange rate is the achievement of 
external balance without undue interference with the pursuit of domestic objectives, 
while policy-makers retain monetary autonomy. By enabling the control of the money 
supply to secure the appropriate mix of employment and inflation, a floating exchange 
rate can reduce anti-inflationary discipline. In addition, since many LDCs like CFA 
countries, are price-takers, exchange rate devaluations generate higher inflation. 
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Table 4: Standard percentage of the SDR, US dollar, UK pound and the French franc from 
the Import-weighted basket peg 
SDR peg US $ peg UK £ peg FF peg Current exchange 
rate policy 
Algeria 03.8 11.9 01.3 Basket peg 
Benin 05.6 13.6 01.9 FF peg 
Burkina Faso 05.1 13.0 00.9 US $ peg 
Burundi 05.9 14.0 13.5 US $ peg 
Cameroon 0.34 11.5 01.5 FF peg 
Central Afr. Rep. 04.5 12.7 00.9 FF peg 
Chad 04.9 12.9 01.0 FF peg 
Congo 04.2 12.3 01.0 FF peg 
Cote d'lvoire 03.5 11.7 01.5 FF peg 
Equat. Guinea 02.0 10.3 Sp pta peg 
Ethiopia 02.5 10.8 US $ peg 
Gabon 04.1 12.2 01.1 FF peg 
Gambia 02.0 10.0 09.5 UK £ peg 
Ghana 00.7 09.0 08.7 UK £ peg 
Guinea 01.4 09.0 US $ peg 
Kenya 01.3 08.5 08.0 US $ peg 
Liberia 06.7 14.6 US $ peg 
Libya 02.1 07.3 07.0 US $ peg 
Malagasy Rep. 04.6 12.7 01.0 FF peg 
Malawi 02.2 07.6 07.0 SDR peg 
Mali 02.2 09.3 04.3 FF peg 
Mauritania 02.3 10.4 02.7 FF peg 
Mauritius 01.2 09.5 09.0 UK £ peg 
Morocco 03.8 12.0 01.5 Basket peg 
Niger 05.5 13.4 01.5 FF peg 
Nigeria 00.8 08.8 08.4 Basket peg 
Rwanda 07.6 15.5 US $ peg 
Senegal 04.4 12.4 01.0 FF peg 
Sierra Leone 01.4 08.3 UK £ peg 
Somalia 02.2 09.8 US $ peg 
South Africa 01.3 09.9 09.6 US $ peg 
Sudan 01.0 09.4 09.1 US $ peg 
Tanzania 01.9 10.8 09.9 US $ peg 
Togo 04.6 12.8 01.8 FF peg 
Tunisia 03.6 11.8 01.4 Basket peg 
Uganda 01.5 09.7 09.2 US $ peg 
Zaire 04.0 12.4 US $ peg 
Zambia 01.2 08.5 US $ peg 
Source: Crockett and Nsouli (1977, pp. 653-4). 
It has been recognized that no developing country has so far successfully floated on a 
sustained basis. Lebanon's longstanding, unique example has just collapsed, despite a 
well developed banking system. Most of the examples in Africa, such as Zambia, Ghana 
and Nigeria, are countries that have introduced foreign exchange auctions within the 
1 8 RESEARCH PAPF:R 5 3 
context of International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization programme, but which are 
still controlling capital movements and the subsequent flourishing parallel markets. 
Foreign exchange auctions collapsed in Zambia and Uganda following a deep fall in the 
exchange rate level. In Ghana and Nigeria, the auction regime still exists and shows 
some positive features. 
In summary, the advantages of flotation for a developing country include the reserve 
holding it permits, a reduction in distortions that may occur as a result of artificially high 
or low exchange rates, and some additional freedom in the pursuit of internal policy 
objectives. On the cost side, there are institutional costs of developing a well functioning 
foreign exchange market and renouncing the use of the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument. 
For CFA countries, given the reluctance to move away from the French franc peg, the 
possibility of independent flotation seems remote, as Lane (1989) concluded. In fact, 
reorganizing the Franc Zone would constitute a tremendous undertaking, and a step-by-
step approach would be the wise path to follow. Moving from 40 years of fixed exchange 
rates to an independent flotation without any prior experience of exchange rate culture 
and exchange rate manipulation would be too hard a step to take at once, assuming that 
France, the ultimate guarantor of the system, agreed to such a reorganization. 
Intermediate exchange rate arrangements 
Between the extreme cases of a permanently fixed rate and independent flotation there 
are various intermediate exchange rate arrangements, including the adjustable peg system 
and the crawling peg. 
Under the adjustable peg system, a country defends the peg but reserves the right to 
alter the exchange rate to correct for disequilibrium. A large number of developing 
countries listed by the IMF as having pegged currencies in fact pursue an adjustable peg. 
We must note the difference between a single-currency adjustable peg and a multi-currency 
adjustable peg. Multi-currency pegging scores over single-currency from a 
macroeconomic adjustment viewpoint. Moreover, the possible microeconomic efficiency 
superiority of single- over multi-currency pegging disappears if the peg is adjustable, 
since the exchange rate is no longer stable against the peg currency. 
Several African countries, such as Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Ghana, that followed 
the adjustable peg regime ended up in crisis. Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius, on the other 
hand, avoided such problems by frequent adjustment in the exchange rate. 
Under the crawling peg system, the country defends the peg in small steps in accordance 
with some pre-announced rule. The crawling peg, like the adjustable peg, could be a 
single-currency or multi-currency peg, with the presumption that a multi-currency 
crawling peg is better than a single-currency one. Only four developing countries are 
listed by the IMF as rule-based crawling peggers: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Madagascar. 
Experience with this system has proved to be reasonably satisfactory for maintaining 
competitiveness. 
After such an extensive review of possible theoretical exchange rate arrangements, 
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we proceed to the practical CFA exchange rate options. Below, we lay down the different 
scenarios in the advent of a unique European currency emerging from the Maastricht 
summit and becoming legal tender in the EU by 1999. 
II. Exchange rate options for the CFA franc 
after 1999 
The issue of a single European currency beyond 1999 emerges. If this single currency 
were to come about, as prescribed by the Delors Report, it is highly likely that European 
countries would sacrifice their national currencies. With the likelihood that the French 
franc would no longer exist as a national currency, it is timely to contemplate the future 
of the CFA franc. Some of the comments that have been made include: 
If there should be a move toward monetary union among EEC states, the 
question of how to handle UMOA (and all CFA zones) will inevitably 
arise. It is generally recognized that the CFA franc is currently overvalued, 
encouraging imports (and smuggling), and probably costly to CFA 
countries' export markets at a time when most of them need increased 
exports and reduced imports. The overvaluation of the CFA and the 
weakness of the banking and financial systems generally in CFA countries 
also represent a cost to the French Treasury. Would a combination of 
financial problems plus a move towards monetary union in the EEC, 
force a reorganization or possibly an elimination of the CFA area? 
(Lancaster, 1989). 
Carol Lancaster in "Completing the European Market: Implications for West Africa" 
(p. 11) from the conference on "The Impact of European Market Implication for West 
Africa", Africa leadership forum, Brussels, Belgium, 21-23 September 1989. 
One can hardly imagine France maintaining an operations account or 
opening an advance account which would have an upper ceiling but 
which would be used to guarantee a currency whose quantity and value 
would be unknown to her (Lelart, 1989). 
Michel Lelart in "The future of the Franc Zone in the context of the construction of 
Europe" from Revue d'Economie Financiere (1989), No. 8/9, p. 201. 
Now that the CFA will be pegged to the ECU as the French government has 
already announced, their parity will definitely, therefore, be difficult for 
France, subjected like other countries of the EEC to severe budgetary 
constraints necessary for the economic convergence on which the success 
of the economic and monetary union is dependent, to continue to support 
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for a long time, an imaginary parity with its budget ... It is, therefore, in 
order to say that the European Monetary System challenges, perhaps totally 
or partially, the Franc Zone (Owoundi, 1992). 
Fouda Owoundi, "Financial Europe and the African Bank (Banque Afrique)", paper 
presented at the International Symposium of the Technical Institute of Banking of Africa, 
the Magrehb and France, Ouagadougou, 25-27 February 1992. 
While a lot has been written or said on this matter, no study has yet seriously considered 
possible scenarios for the CFA franc. In what follows, we try to search for avenues for 
the survival of the CFA as the common currency. 
Following the Maastricht accord of 14-15 December 1991, monetary integration in 
Europe is inevitable and the ECU (European Currency Unit), now the euro, will become 
a single currency by 1999. In the huge Maastricht document, there is no single sentence 
regarding ACP countries, not alone CFA zone concerns. But immediately, the late Pierre 
Beregovoy, then French Finance Minister, announced that the CFA would be pegged to 
the euro by 1999. Reassuring as this may be for political circles, it does not constitute 
analytically an adequate response to the complex issue of the future of the CFA. More 
importantly, such a crucial announcement was made without any consultation with the 
African partners of the Franc Zone, as rightly observed by Owoundi (1992). 
The quotations above give a rather gloomy perspective concerning the status of the 
Franc Zone as it exists today. Hence, the time has come to set forth our alternative 
scenarios for the CFAF. But before embarking on such a delicate endeavour, let us recall 
that from our own computation, we reached the conclusion that the net gains of CFA 
membership are not all beneficial to CFA countries. Our study concerns the period 1975-
1988 where data on the compte d' operations have been available. The net gains include 
the recognized advantages of stability and low inflation, from which we deducted the 
cost associated with the interest rate and the exchange risks. 
In support of our conclusion, many studies have revealed that CFA countries did not 
have the capacity to adjust to external shocks despite stability advantages. Hence, the 
views of Devarajan and de Melo were reversed between their 1987 work on the evaluation 
of the CFA zone and their 1990 CFA assessment. In the latter, they wrote... 
After 1981, changes in the world environment and persistent current account 
deficits meant that CFA countries needed to adjust their economies along 
with other developing countries. Their growth performance was 
disappointing. Under every estimate, CFA zone members' GDP growth rates 
fell behind those of their counterparts, including the other African states... 
The burden of adjustment appears to have fallen disproportionally on 
expenditure-reduction in general, and on investment-reduction in particular. 
It is possible that the very institutional arrangement that enabled these 
countries to enjoy faster and more stable growth in the 1980s is preventing 
them from adjusting to the internal and external shocks of the 1980s (pp. 
23-24). 
2 2 RESEARCH PAPF:R 5 3 
In the same vein, Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) wrote: 
For most of the CFA members, the benefits of lower inflation does not 
appear to have been large enough to offset the costs of reduced output. 
Under "reasonable" output-inflation trade-offs, these countries would have 
been better-off having the flexibility to adjust to external shocks through 
exchange rate adjustment. 
In their study on the "Response of firms to relative price changes in the Cote d'lvoire: 
the implications for export subsidies and devaluations", Newman, Lavy and de Vreyer 
(1990) of the World Bank concluded: 
Firms producing in the tradable goods sector suffer from an overvalued 
exchange rate not only because they would receive a lower price for their 
exports, but also because they must compete against lower priced imports. 
Our estimates indicate that the introduction of an export subsidy alone would 
be insufficient to the tradable goods sector. The combination of an export 
subsidy with an import tariff, which comes closer to mimicking the effects 
of devaluation, would serve to counteract some of the short-run adverse 
output effects of an overvalued exchange rate. 
This over-valuation issue of the CFA was recognized by Patrick and Sylviane 
Guillaumont (1989b) who observed that the new linkage to the ECU would pose a risk 
of over-valuation for CFAF. Past experience has shown that this can be a real threat. 
During the 1970s, many of the Franc Zone countries experienced inflation rates more 
acute than in France (p. 143). 
Finally, Elbadawi and Majd (1992) of the World Bank cautiously noted in their recent 
study: 
These results cast doubt on the merits of a CFA zone-type monetary union 
during a turbulent period such as the one experienced by the zone members 
in the post 1984 period These (CFA) rules, while offering some hope for 
low inflation, appeared not to have been sufficiently forthcoming in bringing 
the necessary adjustment to the CFA economies at times of severe exogenous 
shocks, especially when competing neighbouring SSA countries and LIDCs 
(Low Income Developing Countries) have achieved considerable real 
depreciation through changing their nominal exchange rates. 
The authors then concluded: 
If the latter part of the 1980's is conceived to be a typical turbulent period, 
then the present paper has shown clearly that a prompt response to unforeseen 
internal and external shocks would become synonymous - for the CFA 
members - with adhering to a series of more flexible rules of absorption, let 
alone alignment of the nominal currency. 
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We quote at length these studies to emphasize the problems of the CFA zone, despite 
the apparent stability. The European monetary integration after 1999 may offer a solution 
to a profound reorganization of the CFA zone. The question inevitably arises as to how 
the CFA countries would offer alternative exchange rate arrangements. This is even more 
compelling in the aftermath of the first devaluation experienced within the zone. The 
50% devaluation of 12 January 1994 expressed the need for a more realistic exchange 
rate policy that will make the CFA economies more competitive than previously. Already 
different assessments of the devaluation impact reveal some overall improvement in 
foreign trade and balance-of-payments deficit reduction. It is therefore timely to formulate 
a CFA franc exchange rate policy that will lead to a prompt adjustment. 
We contemplate five different scenarios (Figure 1). Each of these scenarios should 
preserve one of the most important advantages of the CFA zone, which is the experience 
with co-existence and use of a common currency with low inflation despite economic 
divergences. This aspect of economic integration associated with the CFA zone should 
be kept in mind all the time when conceiving the new exchange rate arrangements. The 
five scenarios are: 
• Scenario 1: Pegging to the euro - The much talked-about arrangement that comes to 
mind when speculating about the future CFA exchange arrangement is to peg the CFA to 
the euro after 1999. 
In fact the French Minister of Finance hurried to state after the Maastricht accord that 
the CFA would be linked to the euro. CFA African leaders applauded. But the real issue 
is: On what basis will such a peg be implemented and under what conditions? What are 
the practical modalities of such a peg? More clearly, at what parity will the CFA be 
pegged to the euro? Is this going to be a fixed or adjustable peg? Which CFA will be 
pegged? CFA of UMOA or CFA of BEAC? Separately or together? We will examine 
these questions later. 
• Scenario 2: Multi-currency pegging - A second scenario would be to peg the CFA not 
to the euro alone but to a basket. We suggest first pegging the CFA to the euro, the US 
dollar and the Japanese yen, the three major reference currencies of the world. 
• Scenario 3: ECO WAS-wide single currency - There are attempts within the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to create a unique currency in the zone 
in the future. But looking at the difficulties of the West African Clearing House and the 
poor functioning of ECOWAS in general, one should wonder how realistic this proposal 
is. 
• Scenario 4: The breakdown of the CFA zone and creation of separate national 
currencies - The fourth scenario, which is possible but which everybody studiously avoids 
talking about, is the breakdown of the system as each country, for national sovereignty's 
sake, would be willing to manage its own currency. At a time of bloc building, this 
scenario is highly undesirable, but still possible as there do exist important divergences 
among CFA countries that France refuses to face. If French cover were to be removed, 
how would individual countries react? 
• Scenario 5: Institutionalizing an African monetary fund - An additional scenario 
concerns the institution of an African Monetary Fund. Advocates see the African 
Monetary Fund as a means of attaining monetary independence. On a continent where 
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there have been so many still-born treaties, how realistic is this grandiose proposal? 
Let us examine these scenarios one by one in some detail. 
Scenario 1: Pegging the CFA to the euro 
Beyond all political considerations, the euro seems to be the "natural anchor" to which 
CFA countries could peg their currencies. Indeed, the CFA was already pegged to the 
euro via the French franc. The French franc is part of the EMS, which fluctuates within 
a margin of plus or minus 2.25%. With the euro as the single currency, the margin reduces 
to zero and pegging to the ECU directly will require a much stricter, but bearable, 
discipline. In addition, "the euro is likely to be close to the optimal peg for most if not all 
African countries, whose trade with Europe (of about 60 per cent) is much higher than 
their trade with the USA or Japan", as rightly pointed out by Cobham and Robson (1992). 
With the independence of the European Central Bank and its price stability mandate now 
explicitly written into the Maastricht agreement, the euro can be expected to exhibit low 
inflation under Germany's rigorous disciplined leadership. Pegging to the euro would 
avoid the problems of asymmetries and imbalances. This will happen because the euro 
will be strong enough to ensure that no single African country would influence the direction 
in which other countries will want to go. Pegging to the euro provides the ground for 
more monetary integration. 
This being so, there are two options for the 13 countries of the Franc Zone to peg to 
the euro. 
Option J: Let's assume that the seven countries of BCEAO (Banque Centrale des 
Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) and the six countries of BEAC will pull together and form 
some sort of a supranational central bank despite differences between the two zones. 
Let's call it the Union des Banques Centrales d'Afrique CFA (UBCA-CFA) with a chair 
of the Board of Governors. Beneath this body will be the already existing regional CFA 
central banks, BCEAO and BEAC, very much like the actual structure with regional 
governors. Each central bank will be represented by the national branch in each member 
country. The structure will be as presented in Figure 1. 
Option 2: The second option would be to have each zone as a separate unit, UMOA 
and BEAC zone. Each separate unit will then issue a CFA pegged to euro, but with the 
same parity between the two zones. This possibility arises because in West Africa monetary 
union prevails, while in Central Africa there is a custom union with the same currency. 
In addition, the level of solidarity, as well as the seigniorage sharing between the two 
zones, is quite different. For instance, in UMOA seigniorage is equally distributed but in 
BEAC it is proportionate to the importance of each country in the zone. 
Here some lessons from the Belgium-Luxembourg monetary cooperation system 
should be useful. In that scheme, Belgium is the dominant country but the two countries 
agreed to a common exchange rate policy for their currency. Any exchange rate variation 
can occur only after agreement by the monetary authorities of both countries. 
Hence, in each zone of CFA countries, a proportional representation at the central 
bank, with a veto right, will prevail in order to avoid outright dominance. The political 
Figure 1: Scenarios for future CFA pegging to ECU 
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commitment to a coordinated monetary policy should be clearly stated. 
Furthermore, we assume that divergences among countries of each zone are not 
important enough to hinder harmonization of economic policy. Under such circumstances, 
two more questions come to mind: if there should be a convertibility guarantee as it 
exists in the current institutional arrangement, then one should be concerned with the 
operations account: where it will be located and how it will function. 
Perhaps the most crucial question is to know at what exchange rate the CFA will be 
pegged to the euro; would it be a permanently fixed rate or an adjustable rate? 
Given our previous analysis, based on the work by Collier and Joshi (1989) and 
Crokett and Nsouli (1977), and also given the historical tendency of moving from fixed 
to flexible exchange rate, and in addition, given the conclusions reached by Devarajan 
and de Melo (1990), Devarajan and Rodrik (1991), and Elbadawi and Majd (1992), we 
would opt for an adjustable exchange rate parity. Such flexible pegging will take care of 
the taboo issue of CFA devaluation, which will inevitably occur with the fixed exchange 
rate in the long run. 
Concerning the guarantee of convertibility, it would be wise at this early stage to opt 
for the maintenance of a sort of operations account. But as Lelart (1989) so rightly 
remarked, "we can't see France maintaining an operations account or a compte d'avances 
to guarantee a currency whose money supply and value are beyond her control". 
The compte d'avances allows Maghreb countries, which are also former French 
colonies, to have independent currencies such as the Moroccan dirham or the Algerian 
dinar, and yet to benefit from advances from the French government. These countries 
use the Paris Exchange market for most of their exchange transactions without having to 
keep their foreign reserves in Paris, as do the CFA countries. One wonders why this 
cannot constitute a possible alternative for the CFA countries if a profound reorganization 
of the CFA zone occurs, as it prevails for Maghrebean countries? Moreover, as Owoundi 
(1992) clearly stated, "as soon as the CFAF would be pegged to the euro, as announced 
by the French Government, it is clear that the parity will vary regularly depending upon 
the actual strength of the economy". 
It would be difficult then to maintain the operations account at the French treasury. If 
France were able to convince her partners, in order to reserve the right to make her own 
spending and lending decisions, then the operations account would still be kept at the 
French treasury. 
Beyond such an unlikely event, we foresee that the adjustable pegging to the euro 
should be guaranteed by the European Central Bank, and consequently, an operations 
account should be opened at that European Central Bank. As Patrick and Sylviane 
Guillaumont (1989b) put it 
The establishment of a European monetary unit would have no major 
juridical implications for the Franc Zone. Furthermore, the cash flows 
implied by the negative balances in the operations account can be considered 
as the type of balance of payment assistance that many industrialized 
countries accord to developing economies... It is known that the negative 
balance of operations account that appeared first in 1987 is a very small 
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part of France's official public aid. It is only about 0.2 per cent of France's 
foreign exchange reserves". 
Consequently, this share will be even smaller for the EEC as a whole, should the 
political will exist. 
Such political will sparks other questions. As a sub-group of the ACP, why should the 
CFA countries benefit from special treatment at a time when all of these countries are 
knocking at EEC doors? How will the former British colonies react to such CFA treatment? 
More important, although the operations account is held at the French treasury, most 
of the work on the CFA is conducted at the Banque de France, the treasury being simply 
the bookkeeper. Most of the exchange rate transactions take place at the Banque de 
France where the secretariat of the Franc Zone is located. 
The question naturally arises: Will the future European Central Bank be willing to 
take over this role of the Banque de France? As stated earlier, the Franc Zone is an 
economico-political scheme concerned with more than mere monetary cooperation. If 
the political will prevails, then pegging the CFA to euro is a plausible alternative. 
Scenario 2: Multi-currency pegging 
We demonstrated earlier that the CFA countries, and in fact most African countries, trade 
more with the EEC than with any single country in the world. However, most of the 
imports of oil are denominated in US dollars. Most grants and loans of the major financial 
institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, are also in dollars. Furthermore, given the 
economic weight of Japan, more and more transactions are denominated in the Japanese 
yen. A multi-currency pegging is therefore called for. 
Accordingly, it is conceivable that the CFA be pegged to a composite basket of euro, 
dollar and yen. But all CFA countries should have the same basket in order to avoid 
cross-rate multi-peg variability as well as the rigidities of the single currency pegging. 
This would take care of the drawbacks associated with a single ECU pegging. 
At this early stage, if the issue of convertibility is resolved by lodging the operations 
account at the French treasury or at the ECB, then such guaranteed convertibility would 
be better than pegging to a basket where the convertibility is not guaranteed. 
Scenario 3: An ECOWAS single currency 
The time is ripe for economic bloc-building, from the EEC to the North American trade 
agreement to Pacific rim economic cooperation centred around Japan. 
One of the principal goals of the efforts to integrate the economies of the 16 ECOWAS 
countries is to expand intra-community trade. Several studies have identified the 
impediments to the development of trade expansion. One of them is the widespread 
controls and restrictions on exchange transactions throughout the community that make 
most of the 11 currencies of the member states inconvertible. Currency convertibility is, 
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therefore, an important issue. Among the 11 currencies is the CFAF, a convertible currency 
among 7 of the 16 countries that compose the community. Unfortunately, the experience 
of the community through the West African Clearing House reveals some real difficulties. 
In fact, as Frimpong-Ansah (1987, pp. 22-23) reported, "After 10 years of existence, the 
West African Clearing House (WACH) system remains rather ineffective in terms of 
most of the primary objectives... It has not been able to promote the greater use of national 
currencies, or bring about increasing economies in the use of foreign reserves, or liberalize 
intra-regional trade". 
There have been large and persistent late settlements. This has created transaction 
imbalances with domestic and international ramifications. Hence, given the convertibility 
of the CFAF, BCEAO has held all along a creditor position. Nigeria, on the other hand, 
by not channelling her oil sales through WACH, has held average monthly debtor positions. 
This clearly shows that the convertible nature of CFAF matters in the regional trade. 
Hence, any move towards a single currency in ECOWAS should proceed in a gradual 
fashion, moving from CFA to incorporate other currencies progressively. 
Scenario 4: The breakdown of the CFA zone - Possible 
but undesirable 
Our previous analysis of the gains from pooling reserves has shown that differences do 
exist among countries even within each zone. Some countries have positive balances 
and continue to contribute to the pool. Other indicators of convergence clearly show that 
CFA countries are rather heterogeneous. Growth levels, current account deficit levels 
factors of production costs and per capita income show great variability. However, one 
of the conditions to be met for a successful economic integration is that participating 
countries should have roughly the same income level. In case of wider divergences, 
large movement of capital, labour and net transfers would be necessary to maintain the 
union. Even shares of the monetary aggregates should not be too far apart. On the basis 
of the above, in UMOA, Senegal and Cote d'lvoire are fairly close, whereas the Sahelian 
countries of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso lag behind. In the BEAC zone, Cameroon and 
Gabon dominate, while Chad and the Central African Republic lag behind. If these 
considerations were taken into account, then the CFA countries should regroup to form 
more harmonious blocs. A former BEAC governor once recognized (1989) that even 
within our zone, all countries do not have the same economic conditions. One country 
may need a devaluation and not the next one. One of the strengths of the existence of our 
organization is the solidarity that prevails between all member countries. 
This indicates" that the possibility of disagreement among countries on issues like 
exchange rate alignment is real, if France were to remove her "paternal" guarantee. In 
fact, in 1982, the then Minister of Cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, hit headlines when he 
suggested that more monetary sovereignty should be granted within the Franc zone. 
Specifically, a national currency should be created that will be pegged to the common 
international CFA currency at a specific rate and administered by a central authority. If 
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this were to happen, the CFA zone would break down. 
To avoid such a breakdown, which would yield more balkanization of the monetary 
system in Africa, as happened with anglophone Africa, a common exchange control 
should be in place, and guarantees granted by a central pool that convertibility should 
exist with a common administration. This would reduce the incentives to convert and to 
keep a given country's reserves in other international reserves. 
At a time of economic bloc-building, this scenario should be disregarded. 
Scenario 5: The institution of an African monetary fund 
- myth or reality? 
Some pan-Africanists have suggested that the solution to all the troubles of the continent 
would be a continent-wide monetary union with a supranational governing body in the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) framework. In this spirit, African leaders, during 
the economic summit held in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980, decided to create an African 
monetary fund no later than 1985. Its foremost objective would be "to establish the basis 
of economic integration in Africa. Monetary cooperation between African countries is a 
pre-condition and the AMF would serve as an engine to start that cooperation without 
which it would be practically impossible to accomplish its mission". In such a system, 
according to its advocates, no guarantee from France or the EEC would be necessary. 
The deadline of 1985 is long since gone, a testimony to the lack of political will. How 
then can we seriously consider such a proposal? 
Given the difficulties encountered in the working of limited organizations such as 
ECOWAS, we would rather opt for a gradual process. The African Centre for Monetary 
Studies, the African Development Bank and the existing monetary systems should 
establish a think-tank to meticulously assess the possibility of such a mechanism. In the 
meantime, existing regional monetary cooperation organizations (UMOA, BEAC and 
the Preferential Trade Area - PTA) should gradually establish some compensatory links 
as a starting point. We do not share this grandiose view of a continent-wide monetary 
scheme. The emphasis should be put on the sub-regional and more manageable 
organizations. 
III. Concluding remarks 
In the wake of European economic integration, following the stages of the Delors 
committee, the CFA zone is highly likely to be reorganized. But the bedrock of the Franc 
Zone is the convertibility guarantee granted by France to her former 13 colonies in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The Maastricht accord of December 1991 clearly indicated that the ECU will serve as 
a full-fledged single currency by the year 1999. This implies that European currencies 
will no longer exist as national entities. The French franc guarantee of the CFA then 
becomes questionable. 
This research contemplates the likely scenarios that may be available to the CFA 
countries after 1999. Five different scenarios have been analysed. 
First is pegging the CFA to the euro by the two CFA zones or separately. This is the 
most talked about scenario, and it is also the one obviously favoured by the French 
government. Indeed, since the CFA countries are trading mostly with the EEC, pegging 
to the euro might be the optimal peg. 
But questions remain under the rug. At what parity, fixed or flexible, should the CFA 
be pegged to the ECU? How will the convertibility guarantee, which constitutes the 
most attractive CFA characteristic, be secured. 
From the examination of all the possible exchange rate arrangements, fixed peg (single 
or multi-currency), independent flotation and intermediate regimes (adjustable and 
crawling peg), our study indicates that an adjustable peg to the euro at an early stage 
would be the best arrangement, with a convertibility guarantee at the European Central 
Bank. But questions remain: Which CFA franc will be pegged to the euro - the BCEAO 
or UEMOA CFA or the BEAC or CEMAC CFA franc? Money always has political 
consequences. Can nations with a single currency and a common central bank that is 
accountable not to the nation states, but to a common body-UEMOA in West Africa and 
CEMAC in Central Africa - be truly independent? Can the policy of convergence under 
UEMOA and CEMAC offset national self-interest and specific budget constraints? Some 
fact finding research to the Caribbean islands will be necessary to understand the use of 
the East Caribbean dollar. 
The second option concerns a multi-currency pegging to the euro, US dollar and 
Japanese yen. This option is not for the very near future as some learning process to 
manage the adjustable peg to the euro is necessary. This seems the case for countries like 
Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
The third option is an ECOWAS-wide single currency. This choice, although desirable, 
needs more time to allow ECOWAS itself to become better organized, and existing 
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institutions such as the West African Clearing House, now the West African Monetary 
Agency, to become operational. This would constitute a test of how serious and committed 
the countries' leaderships are to economic integration. 
The fourth possible scenario, which is very undesirable, would be the creation of 
individual country currencies as a result of divergances among CFA countries. At a time 
of economic bloc-building, all necessary safeguards should be taken to overcome such a 
possibility. 
Finally, there has been talk about an African monetary fund that will clear the way for 
the creation of a continent-wide currency. We honestly believe this option is premature 
and the effort should be put into implementing one of the first three scenarios. 
Now that our best scenario has been identified, the next task will be to undertake a 
study on the underlying economic adjustment in CFA economies under a flexible CFA 
pegging regime in the presence of external shocks. This will constitute the subject of 
future research. 
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